COMPARATIVE COMMUNITY STUDIES WITH LARGE N'S
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I: Introduction:

The urban crisis is the major domestic issue of our times. It fills the front pages of our daily newspapers and provides materials for television documentaries. It is one of the central issues of the current presidential campaign. And, according to Gallup, the urban crisis in all its connotations ranks in the eyes of the American public with the Vietnam war as a foremost problem facing the United States today.

Partly as a consequence, urban studies have been restored to a position of prominence in sociology, political science and economics, a peak of popularity which it has not enjoyed for several decades. Undergraduate and graduate courses in urban studies are extremely popular. Research interest has also increased as social scientists have turned to the task of making themselves relevant and as funds have become available.

The urban crisis covers a variety of specific disorders ranging from traffic through education to race relations. Whatever catalogue of specific urban problems one would draw up to exhaust the meaning of the term "urban crisis", it is clear that at the core of the definition would be the related problems of poverty and race relations. In one sense, it is difficult to understand why poverty and race relations should be considered an urban problem when both problems are probably more serious in rural areas. In another sense, it is perfectly understandable why the term "urban crisis" has become virtually a euphemism for poverty and race relations because it is in the urban areas where the action is taking place. Poverty and race relations lie at the heart of the urban crisis because that is where the black poor are in ferment and as a consequence that is where the attention of our public officials and mass media is focussed.

A goodly portion of urban research is also concerned with the action -- how decisions are made, the course of political negotiations among public officials, civic leaders and black leaders, how resources are mobilized and distributed to meet the crisis and how the policies adopted are affecting the outcome of the urban crisis.

Research into community decision-making is just now emerging from the primitive stage of case studies of individual cities and specific decisions. To be sure, we have learned a great deal from the insights of sensitive researchers and from the concepts and propositions which have emerged from such case studies. However, at this point we have arrived at an impasse confronted with contradictory findings from the many case studies and as yet unable to allocate the variance in findings to differences among researchers, methods or cities. This small crisis in urban research is widely recognized among researchers who are at the heart of the problem. However, few are willing to live up to the implications of this impasse; the necessity for large scale comparative studies.

The main obstacle to facing up to this necessity lies in very heavy commitment that a researcher would have to make to carry on comparative studies of communities using conventional research methodology. The few comparative studies that have been made so far (e.g., Agger, Goldrich and Swanson) have taken years to accomplish and are expensive both in terms of resources and time, and few have either the funds or the patience to carry them out.

This paper is concerned with giving an example of how community studies involving relatively large numbers of communities can be undertaken, provided that one is willing to make certain sacrifices, trading off richness of data for large numbers of cases. Note that this strategy is precisely that which supports the use of sample surveys as opposed to intensive case studies of individuals. In other words, what we are proposing and illustrating in this paper is an analogue to the sample survey of households applied to the study of communities.

Properly worked out, this strategy should make it possible to conduct comparative community studies with large N's at unit costs in terms of time and resources considerably below that involved in the usual case study. It is a strategy which involves certain risks: It may mean settling for relatively crude measurements on any one particular community in favor of systematic measurements on a large number of communities. It may also involve restricting the number of variables measured to a relatively small number, increasing the risk that the variable(s) that may turn out to be critical have not been measured at all.

We feel that the advantages of large N comparative data justify the risks involved. First of all, such a strategy eliminates the tedious arguments over what are the "facts" concerning American cities. Floyd Hunter writes that Atlanta, Georgia has a power structure in which a handful of wealthy businessmen make all the important decisions and therefore cities are undemocratic. In contrast, Robert Dahl writes that New Haven has a pluralistic decision-making apparatus and that therefore cities are healthily democratic. It is difficult to know whether these two authors disagree because their biases are different, because their methods differ or because the two cities they studied were different.
Secondly, because the universe of cities in the United States is not very large, the study of large samples of communities will lead inevitably to the accumulation of data over time about many cities making it possible to make statements concerning historical trends. We have proposed to maximize this feature by establishing a "permanent" sample of communities, representing a probability sample of cities in the country, in each of which a data collection apparatus would be set up making it possible to conduct researches whose results would accumulate over time representing eventually an archive of time trends.

Finally, the replication implicit in large N comparative community studies means that researchers will tend to converge on a common set of concepts and operational measures. We can therefore expect that the constrictions on speculation imposed by having relatively hard data will make it possible to move the conceptual development of the field of urban studies forward faster.

The viewpoint expressed in this paper is not unique to the authors. The researches of Oliver Williams, Henry Eulau, Michael Atken, Sidney Verba and a number of others all represent illustrations of this new approach. Our unique contribution has been to propose and set up an institutional device -- The Permanent Community Sample -- to make large N comparative community studies easier to conduct.

In this paper, we will draw upon data from a prototype large N community study to illustrate the nature and importance of the contributions these comparative studies can and will make. The sample concerns what has come to be a critical problem in the study of cities: Who has power?

II: The Problem of Community Power:

Our approach to the problem of community power is to regard power as residing in important sectors of the community rather than in individuals. Whether or not one starts with the attribution of power or influence to specific individuals, in the end the critical questions end up to be which of the major groups in a community yields more influence on the raising and their settlement of issues. Indeed, the controversy over community power mainly centers around whether elected political officials have more or less influence on the outcome of decisions than do the owners or managers of large business enterprises. The main difficulty with most studies of this problem is that they have relied upon informants to decide which group has more power, not recognizing that this is a problem in the analysis of facts rather than in simply knowing what the facts are. In other words, it is a kind of apples and oranges comparison.

Our concern here will be with three sectors of the community -- business and civic leaders; public officials and political party officials; and the general citizenry. Because the decision-making roles of each of the three groups are so different in nature, it is not possible to make sensible statements concerning which of the three has "more power" than the others. For example, in a very real sense, the citizenry have the final say since they have the power to replace public officials through the electoral process, but in a day-to-day sense the citizens are not well enough organized ordinarily to make much of an impact. Similarly, public officials by virtue of the fact that many decisions by law are left to them to make, can easily be shown to make most (but not necessarily the most important) of the public decisions in any community. In some cities this means that the dominant political party can set overall policy and enforce it through its control over elected officials and through them the municipal bureaucracy. Where elected public officials and party leaders lack power it is because they cannot defend themselves against the risk of being defeated in an election or because they lack the courage to run that risk.

In this rather ambiguous battlefield the civic leader and business man frequently emerges as the dark horse who winds up with most of the winnings. By playing the civic-leader game -- by contributing time, money, prestige and technical knowhow -- civic leaders drawn from the business sector of the community may often be able to take de facto control over decision-making.

These three groups are ordinarily engaged in a long and continual battle for favorable balances of power. The city becomes in effect a territory divided into three nations. But whenever a small battle is fought over the details of how much of one decision belongs to which group, it is not seen as part of a war. Everyone accepts the boundary lines of decision-making as natural and right when they represent the results of battles fought long ago and which have divided the territory into traditional "turfs".

For these reasons we can anticipate that the structural similarities among American communities will insure that each of the three major groups will be playing similar roles in each community but that the boundaries of traditional jurisdictions will vary from place to place. It is therefore difficult to phrase the question in terms of who has power over whom in each city, but it is easier to compare how much leeway each group has in each city. In other words, we can more easily make statements which rank communities in the extent to which business and civic leaders play important roles than we can make statements indicating the extent to which business and civic leaders predominate in decision-making over elected public officials.
III: Measuring Participation in Decision Making:

There are many problems in the comparative study of communities where it does not look as if it will be possible without very drastic innovations in data-collection techniques to conduct studies in a large number of communities easily and inexpensively. For example, if one is concerned about the way in which differences in public attitudes towards education relates to per capita expenditures for education, it is difficult to avoid taking sample surveys within each city, a process which rapidly adds up to a very expensive operation for even a small set of cities. If one were willing to settle for samples of size 100 (an unreasonably small size in the eyes of most researchers) in each of 100 cities, the interviewing task would be larger than all but the largest of survey operations could sustain and the costs would be correspondingly very high.

But, there are many problems in the study of which it is appropriate to consider using very small numbers of highly selected respondents in each city to provide information adequate to characterize that city. For example, if one is concerned with the policies followed by central institutions, e.g. the police department or public school system, it is appropriate to collect such data from a small handful of persons who are in a position to know about the issue in question. Thus a study of school board decisions concerning desegregation or the selection of a new school superintendent can be conducted sensibly by interviewing key persons involved — the school superintendent and members of the school board. In short, when we are concerned with the organizational life of the community in circumstances wherein knowledge is concentrated in the hands of a few, we can more easily envisage how very large N comparative community studies can be undertaken without courting bankruptcy. The example given in this paper is one of the cases in point.

The data upon which this paper is based were generated by using a small set of persons as informants in each of fifty-one cities. In each city, we picked eight respondents each selected because his position in the community provided him with particularly intimate knowledge concerning the decision-making processes of that community. Each informant was interviewed using a structured questionnaire by skilled interviewers of the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. Structured questionnaires were used to provide comparability across communities and were carefully pretested to insure that they neither offended the informant by being too simple-minded nor missed important information by being too crude to pick up local nuances. Each type of informant received a questionnaire tailored to that informant's particular sphere of competence although questions common to all respondents formed the core of the questionnaires used.

The eight informants selected were as follows: Executive of the Chamber of Commerce, the top official of the local labor council, the editor of the largest newspaper, the president of the local bar association, the president of the largest bank, the two chairman of the local political parties, and the Mayor.

The participation of each city's citizenry in the decision-making process was measured by three questions administered to each of the cities. The items asked how many public meetings are held to discuss a typical city decision, how many persons come to such meetings and whether decisions are changed because of citizen response.

Does the index show enough reliability to be treated as a measure of anything? The sets of responses are so highly intercorrelated that a sophisticated test is not necessary. Each of the eight sets of responses was correlated against the mean score of all eight for that city. Since each contributes towards this mean there is, of course, a spurious association. If the responses were truly uncorrelated, then each response would correlate with the grand mean with a gamma of about .25. The actual gammas are considerably higher than that: they average .67 and range from .41 (labor leaders) to .88 (Chamber executives). It is clear that the eight respondents are agreeing with each other in describing the degree of citizen participation in their city.

IV: Measuring the Power of Business

The power of the business sector is measured by a reputational question. Each of the same eight respondents was asked to consider five issue areas: the selection of candidates for the school board, the passage of a municipal bond referendum, the adoption of an urban renewal project, the adoption of a program of air pollution control, and the selection of a mayor, and asked to consider whether the support of any of fifteen different groups should be considered essential, important, or not important in the selection of the candidate or the adoption of the program in question. The fifteen include five business groups: the Chamber of Commerce, retail merchants, industrialists, bankers, and a category called "other businessmen". The responses to these five groups by these eight respondents were averaged for the city to produce an overall score.

Again we must consider whether there is agreement among the eight respondents about the amount of influence that groups have. Using the average percentage for that group and issue across all cities, we can compute the expected number of times each particular group will be considered essential on a particular
issue by all but one of the respondents in any particular city. The expected number of times that this should occur for each group and issue is totalled across the 75 combinations of groups and issues. When this is done we find that we can expect all but one of the respondents to agree that a certain group is essential only approximately 32 times. In fact, this happens 81 times. The differences between the extreme cities are impressive. In Albany, New York, for example, the Democratic party is judged "essential" 28 times out of 30 ratings, while no other group receives this rating more than four times. In contrast, in Palo Alto, neighborhood groups are singled out as essential 15 times while neither political party is ever given this rating.

Since we wish to measure the influence of the business community relative to other groups, the total influence score of the five business groups was compared to the scores of the other ten groups in the city and the final business influence score used was the deviation from a regression line through the data. Thus we are measuring the relative influence of the business community in comparison to other groups in the city.

V: Measuring the Power of Political Parties

The measures of the strength of political parties is based upon the following conception of a "strong" local political party: A "strong" party is one which can limit the number of people who have the opportunity to be elected to public office. It should be composed of an elite group of people within the party who are set apart from the rank and file because they are most active and because they share among themselves the spoils of political office.

Four items were used to provide an overall portrait of the strength of political parties in each of the fifty-one cities.

First, the subjective reputation of the party which controls most of the offices was judged by the eight informants at the same time as they were rating the influence of business groups. Secondly, the influence of the dominant political party on elections for mayor was singled out and given a heavier weight. A third item used to separate strong from weak parties is whether it is able to limit its candidates to those who are loyal party members. The strong party is one whose candidates come up through the ranks as reported by the party chairman. The fourth measure is the availability of government offices - patronage - to party officials. Presumably the party which has jobs can buy discipline with those jobs and can convert the loyal work of patronage employees into the ability to control a larger section of the electorate.

The four measures are highly intercorrelated. The Patronage-base parties recruit their candidates from the ranks of party regulars, as we all have assumed; the gamma is .37. When these two measures are combined into a single code they correlate with a gamma of .68 against the informant's rating of the party's influence on mayors elections and .40 with its influence on all five issues. The combined rating would be quite satisfactory except for the fact that there is a significant amount of missing data because of respondent refusal to submit to interviews or to answer certain questions, making it necessary to adjust for missing data.

VI: The Balance of Power Between Sectors

As we stated, we do not believe it possible to decide which sector has more power in absolute terms. For all we know, every city may be "really" ruled by business, or none may be. In a first look at the data, we assumed the three groups to be, on the average across all cities roughly equal in power - the data are normalised.

The cities were divided into trichotomies on the three different measures of influence and the city was assigned into a cell in an overall typology depending on which of the three groups: business, local parties, or citizens, was most influential, or assigned a coalition cell in the table if two or all three of the groups were tied in influence. After this was done the typology seems somewhat unsatisfactory; for example Memphis, Tennessee, was described as a citizen-dominated city, which seems rather unlikely. The typology was then modified by scoring cities as either high or low on citizen participation, with the majority of the cities being dropped into the low category. One other change was made; party data were missing for Newark, N. J. and since we had a fairly good knowledge of the structure of the political parties there we supplied what we believed to be the correct answers to the questions which were not answered there.

Figure One shows the cities in the seven cells of the typology. When we compare the number of cases in each category with the expected frequencies derived from a random model, we find that each of the three pure types - the cities dominated entirely by citizens, entirely by business, and entirely by political parties - are more frequent than expected. There are 36 such cities, compared to an expectation of only thirty. The most frequent type is the business-dominated city. Of course, this distribution should not be taken too seriously since it is in part an artifact of the normalizing process described earlier.

A number of the business-dominated com-
FIGURE I: BALANCE OF POWER IN THE 51 CITIES

I: Citizens
- Berkeley
- Palo Alto
- Pasadena
- Phoenix
- San Francisco
- Duluth
- Schenectady
- St. Paul

III: Citizens-Business
- Fort Worth
- Amarillo

IV: Balanced
- Santa Ana, Cal.
- Minneapolis
- Salt Lake City
- Memphis
- Euclid

V: Business
- Tampa
- Hamilton, O.
- Seattle
- Irvington, N.J.
- Charlotte
- San Jose, Cal.
- Fullerton, Cal.
- Tyler, Texas
- Long Beach
- Waukegan, Ill.
- Birmingham
- St. Petersburg
- Waco
- Atlanta
- Santa Monica

VI: Party
- Hammond, Ind.
- Utica, N.Y.
- Newark
- Boston
- Gary
- Indianapolis
- Manchester, N.H.
- Jacksonville
- Milwaukee
- Clifton, N.J.

II: Citizens-Party
- Buffalo
- Cambridge
- Bloomington, Ind.

VII: Business-Party
- Akron
- Waterbury, Conn.
- Malden, Mass.
- Pittsburgh
- South Bend

St. Louis
- Albany, N.Y.
munities are southern cities and they are generally somewhat smaller, on the average, than cities in other categories. Political parties are frequently very weak in these cities and a number of them have city manager government. They are not, however, all clean government cities, nor are they necessarily all well administered cities. Conversely, the political party-dominated cities are not all dens of sin, although there are a few that might fit that description.

The most interesting categories are the citizen-dominated cities and the cities where the citizens and the political parties share power. The first case includes a number of "ideal" good government, weak party, mass movement cities of which Berkeley and Palo Alto, which score at one extreme on this citizen participation scale, are good examples, but also include Duluth, Schenectady and St. Paul. The latter may be in the sample because of the weakness of political parties and the strength of such citizen groups as ethnic groups and labor in these cities. In working-class cities such groups are the functional equivalent of citizen organizations. The citizen-party coalition is an unlikely coalition and indeed the three cities in that category are unlikely cities. Cambridge and Bloomington, Indiana are cities with traditional political parties but which live in the presence of articulate universities; it would be fair to talk about those two cities as having a citizen-party conflict rather than a citizen-party coalition. The other city, Buffalo, has very weak political parties which are torn by ethnic conflict.

The Lincoln Steffins cities -- those where business and party leaders share the power -- are not common; there is a definite negative association between the amount of power these two groups have, \( r = -0.52 \), and there are only five such cities in the sample.

The residual category which we have called balanced cities, are simply cities in which all three sectors are rated as having much influence, as in the case of Minneapolis, Santa Ana, or Salt Lake City, or alternatively where these sectors are seen as having very little influence, such as Memphis or Euclid.

VII: How the Balance of Power Affects Decision-Making

We next need to verify that this typology of cities is of some value. Intuitively, it conforms to the conventional wisdom that we have about such cities as Atlanta or Pittsburgh but beyond that, it would be nice to know that we have in fact described the cities in such a way that we can predict how they will behave.

While we plan to carry on such an analysis, we are not optimistic; for while the typology tells us which group in the community dominates, it does not tell us what the group's political ideology is, or how efficient they are in obtaining their goals. In Berkeley, citizen participation reflects a very liberal ideology; in Pasadena it manifests itself in right wing radicalism. Atlanta, with its liberal business community, and Birmingham, with its conservative leadership, fall in the same category; or to look at it a different way, the strong political parties of Milwaukee are reasonably efficient in governing their city, while those in Jacksonville seem quite incapable of efficient government. Thus, we cannot expect very much clear difference in either the type of programs which the cities pursue or in the success in reaching their goals.

However, we can talk about the way in which the balance of power in each community controls, if not the outcomes of issues, at least the kinds of issues which come up. Bachrach and Baratz', in particular stress non-appearance of an issue as being of central importance in the study of power, for the power of a group may be reflected more in its ability to force an issue into the decision-making arena, or to prevent it from being brought up.

The eight respondents in our sample were asked to describe the major problems facing their city. These issues were then divided into four categories: first, issues of economic development and taxes; second, issues of providing services to the citizens; third, governmental reform; and fourth, issues of an ideological nature, either race relations or the whole issue of the amount of community conflict itself.

When we look at the seven types of cities in Table 1, we see a fairly simple story. The cities in which business is either the controlling group or shares in the power are most likely to be concerned with economic development. Those cities in which the parties are strong or which are balanced are most concerned with services (or parenthetically, with government reform, which is not a separate category here); and citizen-dominated cities are most concerned with ideological issues.

There are only six cities in the sample which consider race relations their most serious problem. These data were gathered a couple of years ago, and the number may be higher now. Two of these, Pasadena and San Francisco, one would not think of as having especially severe racial tensions; but these are cities in which a high level of citizen participation has permitted a popular issue with mass appeal to rise to prominence. The other cities are party or business dominated. One, Atlanta, has worked very hard to avoid anticipated racial difficulty and the other three, Birmingham, Gary, and Waukegan, Illinois, have probably had the issue raised in a revolt against an inflexible power structure which suppressed the issue until it boiled over. In general, the issues
### TABLE I: POWER TYPOLOGY AND MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM AS SEEN BY INFORMANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Problem</th>
<th>Typology: Dominant Power Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth, Business Renewal, Tax base</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services to Citizens</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Reform</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Issues, Conflict</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: one city not coded

Summary:
- Business-dominated cities are more likely to say "economic dev": \( r = .56 \)
- Party cities are more likely to say "services, reform": \( r = .61 \)
- Citizen cities are more likely to say "ideology": \( r = .58 \)

which dominate the party-cities are often of this same rebellious character, and seem to have been raised against the wishes of the rulers. For example, all four of the cities which consider education to be their most serious problem are of this type.

With the small number of cases at our disposal, it is difficult to make a convincing argument. To strengthen our case, let us single out the eight most ideal cases, which are shown in the heavy boxes of the sundial in Figure 1. In both Berkeley and Palo Alto, the major issue is that there is too much conflict and mistrust. In the four business-dominated cities, the issues are taxes, the rate of population growth, and in two cases, economic growth. In the two extreme party-dominated cities, St. Louis and Albany, the issues are the tax base and housing. Thus, seven of the eight cities fit our conception very well. Citizen cities fight about things citizens are interested in; business cities worry about business; and party cities get screamed at for doing things wrong.

Next, let us ask how an issue is handled once it enters the arena in these cities.

Table 2 looks at the seven types of cities and asks, compared to other cities of the same size, is there more or less conflict in each type of city? The controversy measure is based on the responses of our informants about the level of controversy in ten different issue areas, and the data has been standardized to remove the effect of city size, since large cities have more controversy than smaller ones. The table indicates that the highest level of controversy appears in three types of cities; one type, of course, is the citizen-dominated city; the other types are those where the parties are coequal in influence with either citizens or business. The findings are not statistically reliable, (whatever that means with this type of sample) but they are plausible.

### TABLE 2: POWER TYPOLOGY AND LEVEL OF CONTROVERSY, STANDARDIZED TO REMOVE THE EFFECT OF CITY SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Controversy</th>
<th>Typology: Dominant Power Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% High</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78
In a previous paper on the amount of controversy which is found in citizen-dominated cities, we suggest that the controversies are the result of the ease with which people can be mobilized to take part in debate. Cities in which political parties are strong but other groups are strong also may be conflict-prone because of the conflicting interests of the groups. This is certainly true when one thinks of the town-gown controversies in Cambridge or Bloomington, and might fit Buffalo, where the ethnic groups are pursuing goals at variance with the political parties which keep attempting to build coalitions between them. Similarly, we would guess that the five business-party cities are troubled by the traditional reform issues which have made these two groups rival over the years, and which results, in this sample, in a general negative correlation between the amount of influence each has; cities are either reformed, or they are not, and these cities may be struggling because they have not yet gone one way or the other. Controversy, of course, does not mean bad government: experienced observers would probably say that some very well-governed cities and some very badly-governed cities have high controversy.

VIII: Why Do Cities Have Different Power Balances?

If we have given the reader enough data to guess that our typology is valid, we will look quickly at the question of why different cities have different forms of power structures. In Tables 3 and 4 we look at only two variables, and we discover a fairly straightforward story there.

Table 3: Per Cent of Population College Graduates, and Power Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology: Dominant Power Sector</th>
<th>% College Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cit-Bus</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus-Par</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cit-Par</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary:

% of cities business-dominated 41% 35% 53% (r = .16)
% of cities citizen-dominated 6% 24% 41% (r = -.62)
% of cities party-dominated 77% 35% 12% (r = -.77)

Table 4: Suburbanization of Managers, Owners, Proprietors, and Power Typology (Cities of over 100,000 Pop.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology: Dominant Power Sector</th>
<th>Ratio: % Managers, Owners, Proprietors in City</th>
<th>% Managers, Owners, Proprietors in Metropolitan Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 - .89</td>
<td>.90 - .99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cit-Bus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus-Par</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cit-Par</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary:

% of cities business-dominated 7% 50% 67% (r = .75)
% of cities citizen-dominated 36% 8% 33% (r = -.14)
% of cities party-dominated 64% 42% 22% (r = -.53)
Table 3 indicates that citizens tend to be influential where they have the resources for leadership; citizen-dominant cities have large numbers of well-educated people; and these are the cities where parties have been weakened by reform. Second, we see in Table 4 that businessmen have influence where they have a stronger interest; namely, in cities where they have not yet fled to the suburbs.

Needless to say, all of this analysis is in a very preliminary stage, but we think it is clear that the ability to gather standardized data over a large enough number of cities to permit traditional survey-style statistical analysis with cross-tabulations will pay some dividends.

The data described here was gathered under a grant from the National Science Foundation to determine the feasibility of this approach, and the data will be used for a more extensive study of the issues of air-pollution and urban renewal. The Johns Hopkins University, the National Opinion Research Center, and a number of political scientists across the nation will be involved in creating what we have called a permanent community sample of 200 cities of over 50,000 population, including all cities of over 150,000 population in the United States. Studies of school desegregation and of the local Community Action Agencies are underway in some of these cities, and other studies are being either designed, discussed, or dreamed about. Since the sample is indeed permanent, each study will contribute to a data archive which will eventually provide for all of us the opportunity to get at the questions we have all wondered about; what types of cities have riots, for example; or what difference does it make whether the local newspaper is the St. Louis Post Dispatch or the Chicago Tribune? Should Washington, D. C. have an elected School Board? Why can't Milwaukee have major league baseball and why does Pittsburgh have a good symphony? And eventually it may be that we can consider again the question political scientists have given up hope of answering; what type of governing institutions should cities have to accomplish the things they want to do?

Footnotes:

1. Matthew Crensen contributed a number of valuable suggestions for the data analysis given here. James J. Vanecko directed the study from which the data are taken.


