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Introduction. Lack of citizen cooperation has caused unusual problems in the last two decades for census takers in England, Germany, The Netherlands, and Switzerland. This paper describes and discusses the most recent situation--that in Germany--and briefly reviews the problems in other European countries.

The West German population and housing census, last conducted in April 1970 and having been scheduled three times since then, was postponed on April 13, 1983 by Constitutional Court order. This last postponement culminated an extraordinarily broad-based and powerful protest by German citizens, press, and officials. On December 15, 1983, the Constitutional Court ruled that the census may occur. However, access to census data was severely limited, and any future census legislation must consider alternatives to a full census. After testimony and debate, the West German Parliament, in April 1985, passed enabling legislation for a census. When the Census will occur or how successful it may be are not known.

Perceptions of the census--what it would have done and why it was stopped--differ significantly in Germany, even among very knowledgeable persons. Under these conditions I do not expect this report of events to be completely accurate nor these interpretations completely valid.

In brief summary, the enabling legislation for the most recent census was passed unanimously by the Bundestag in 1982. Apart from a recurring disagreement about funds allocations, no discernible problems with the census occurred until dissidents raised minor objections in the fall of 1982. These objections were indirect and scattered until February 1983 when, in the course of 6 to 8 weeks, they exploded. Three of the most reputable and influential German news publications then urged that the census be stopped, and many members of the Bundestag--some who had voted for the Census law--turned against it. A reputable survey indicated that one-quarter of the population would break the law and risk substantial fines by boycotting the census. More than 1000 suits to halt the census were filed with the Constitutional Court. The Court selected and heard two and granted their request.

The protest's basis is simply stated: Fear of the possibilities that government agencies--national, state, and local--might use census data against individuals. This fear has no basis in actual experience since the critics have not found a single instance of government misuse of census data in postwar Germany, and only one instance of an attempt. The fear also has little basis in law, since all legal uses of most census data can be only for statistical purposes. Instead, the fear arises from the documented increases in the desire of German government agencies for microdata, in the increasing power of computers to make such data usable, and in the explicit scenarios for misuse that persons who know something about the various available data files have been able to devise. The Federal Statistical Office has itself been little criticized. Rather, many people fear that it, and they, have too little control over others' uses

of the data.

In this process, high officials and distinguished newspapers and magazines have gone on to state that census data are not really very necessary and not worth the risk. Other parts of the government statistical system may now be in jeopardy. At the least, every question and procedure for every survey must now be scrutinized.

The rest of this report contains material useful for understanding the European census situation:

- overview of the West German statistical system
- description of census data flow and access, according to the 1982 census law and in practice
- history of the 1981, 1982, 1983 census
- the Court decision and the future
- beyond Germany
- concluding points

Overview of the German Statistical System. This statistical system has five distinct parts: The Federal Statistical Office, the 11 state statistical offices, many municipal statistical offices, private survey and research organizations, and the "data protection officers." The relationships among these entities seem responsible for some of the recent predicament.

The Federal Statistical Office, under the aegis of the Ministry of Interior, supplies all demographic and economic data to federal agencies. The federal government outlines its data needs in a specific area and initiates legislation for a survey to be conducted for this purpose. Only after the respective law has been established can the Federal Statistical Office together with the state statistical offices conduct the survey. A large portion of the surveys, along with the population and housing census and the annual microcensus, are actually conducted by the state statistical offices with the Federal Statistical Office being responsible for the content and methodology, the nationwide coordination of survey operations, and the presentation of national results. Most surveys, as well as the population and housing census, are legally obligatory for respondents. However, neither the Census nor any survey enjoys a constitutional mandate; therefore, each requires special legislation and approval by the legislative bodies of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. By law, the Federal Statistical Office must be involved in most federal projects that involves the collection of new statistical data or the analysis of data already collected by the Office. A federal agency can generally use an outside vendor for such work only after the Statistical Office determines that it cannot or will not do the work. Much work, especially analysis, does go to the outside.

Each state has its own statistical office. The state statistical offices are administrative bodies of the states and, thus, operate independently from the Federal Statistical Office. However, since federal statistical laws legally bind the states, the state statistical offices are required to conduct surveys for federal purposes.

The states, sometimes along with the municipalities, actually hire, train, and manage the field staff. In the case of the census, the Federal Government reimburses the states for some of their expenses. In practice, the state offices and the Federal Office meet and talk together very frequently, and I judge that it is difficult to do much without a consensus.¹

The state offices keep their data from the federal surveys, and conduct and publish analyses. These offices forward to the Federal Office whatever tabulations are required for federal purposes. In Wiesbaden, the Federal Office collects and publishes these results. Accordingly, the Federal Statistical Office actually keeps relatively little microdata. To do national-level analyses, the Federal Office either requests and combines the separate state analyses or, in rare cases, calls together and analyzes the necessary microdata for the required period, then destroys its copy. The strong role of the states is clear in these relationships, as in other parts of the German federal system.

The towns and cities are important actors in three ways. First, their concerns emerge as questionnaire items. Some questions about commuting patterns, for example, were on the 1983 census form largely to satisfy the requests of municipalities. Second, the towns and cities also mount field operations. In the census, for example, most of the field staff would be retained and managed by the municipalities, with each place having considerable discretion over the types of workers it uses. Cities can also do their own surveys on a voluntary response basis.

Third, the municipalities maintain the population registers. Federal law and state law provide for these to contain basic demographic information about each person who lives in a municipality for any length of time. Because each area of the country is part of a municipality, the combined registers theoretically document all the country's inhabitants. Upon moving to a new place, a person is supposed to register. Since school attendance, voting, the use of public recreation facilities and other activities require proof of registration, the population registers are probably quite complete. In fact, they are overcomplete, because persons who have moved away sometimes remain on the lists by mistake or because the authorities were not notified. Over 90 percent of the registers are computerized. The municipalities can use their register data for statistical, administrative, and law enforcement purposes.

Apart from these "statistical" data, a great deal of administrative data on persons are maintained by other federal, state and local offices and agencies concerned with immigration, health, schooling, and other matters. In addition, some universities and many private institutes and firms are in the business of collecting and/or analyzing personal or household data of one type or another.

The remaining component of the German statistical system is unknown in the U.S. and most other countries. The Constitution provides that the federal government will have a Data Protection Officer. Each state also has a Data Protection Officer. Most of them are lawyers, statisticians, or information science specialists. Their

responsibility is to protect citizens from illegal uses of data by the government, private organizations, or other citizens. Acting on their own initiative or in response to a complaint, these Officers can subpoena an agency's or organization's data and documents. They may work with the organization to correct inappropriate practices. They also refer cases to the federal or state government for action, appear as expert witnesses in administrative and court proceedings, and prepare annual reports on their activities. Finally, the Data Protection Officers have much influence through the press, and their opinions are widely known and respected.

Census Data Flow and Access (According to the 1982 Census Law and in Practice). The 1982 Census Law specifies two purposes for the census of population and housing: to provide information for planning by local, state, and national governments, and to provide information for correcting the local population registers. In addition, other laws provide for the determination of election districts by population, although the population figures needn't come from a census. Moreover, revenue sharing between the nation, states, and communities depends on population figures. Finally, the federal and state statistical offices use the census as a survey frame.

The figure depicts the flow of census microdata according to the Census Law of 1982. I will describe relevant features of the census process and of subsequent data access, following the figure.

Each city or town, depicted in the upper right corner, has a statistical office that recruits, trains, and manages census workers. In October 1982, these offices conducted a pre-list mail enumeration of dwelling units owned by absentee landlords and some other dwelling units. Community census workers are paid a nominal sum,² and it is every adult citizen's legal obligation to serve if called. Some communities were planning to use teachers; others were to use students, unemployed persons, and in a few places, policemen, social workers, or employees of the local tax office. About 600,000 such workers were to participate, using a drop-off, pickup procedure. The respondents could also mail the questionnaires directly to the statistical offices. However, the census form itself is abnormally large, larger than the envelopes readily available for sale in stores. Because the form is not to be folded (for data processing reasons) and according to the Law of Statistics for Federal Purposes no return-envelope or stamp is to be provided to respondents, respondents would have to put up with considerable trouble and some expense to mail back their forms. Consequently, local enumerators would likely have to retrieve some substantial portion of the forms.

The municipal statistical offices are then to check and edit the forms, phoning or revisiting households when necessary. At this stage, the municipalities make use of the telephone numbers recorded by respondents on the first page of the census form and of the 8-digit questionnaire number pre-stamped on each page. The municipal and state statistical offices were to use the eight-digit questionnaire number pre-stamped on each page to aggregate individual respondent data to

the household level and to count the number of households. The number would not correspond to any administrative ID numbers.

After editing and checking, the Census Law stipulates that the persons in the municipality who maintain the population registers then get the information in the first six questions on the form. These local officials are to update the registers using these data on name, address, age, sex, citizenship, and religion. In practice, the questionnaire page containing these six questions also contains other questions, and it would appear difficult for local officials to keep them separate. One person told me that the offices would photoduplicate this part of the page. A further problem is that the persons who work in the local statistical office and who maintain the local register are one and the same in many small places. All in all, it seems likely that many local register officials would have access, if only briefly, to data they would not have access to were it not for their statistical function in the census.

Having allowed the registers to be updated, the municipal statistical offices are then to deliver the questionnaires to their respective state statistical offices. The state offices do further edits and prepare tabulations for state publications and for the Federal Statistical Office's use in national publications. The Federal Office also receives and keeps a one percent sample of census records without names and with street coded addresses, for analysis purposes. No names are retained on any census tapes. This completes the data flow associated with the census procedure *per se*.

Thereafter, who can obtain what kinds of census microdata and under what conditions? To begin, any person or organization who can show cause can look at the population part of local registers (corresponding to the first six questions on the census form).³ The left portion of the figure indicates that federal and state ministries and the highest agencies can obtain microdata with names and religion removed. Street addresses remain on the file. A state ministry receives them from the Federal Statistical Office which must first request delivery of the files from the state offices. These data files can then go to other government agencies and offices and to private research organizations for tasks designated by the principal ministry. Data obtained in this way are to be used only for statistical purposes, not administrative purposes, and every person who uses such data must sign a confidentiality pledge.

Following the census process, towns and cities (at the bottom of the figure) can also receive from their state statistical offices microdata without names, in tape or disk form. The many communities without computer facilities have argued that they must instead receive the actual questionnaires or copies thereof. The law is not clear on this point, but it appears that the communities would be able to obtain the questionnaires--including street addresses and probably names. Again, the law stipulates that these data are to be used for statistical purposes only and that all persons who handle them are to sign the confidentiality oath.

Finally, any German university or government research institute can receive the data without

names and street addresses to be used for its own research purposes. Private research institutes may not receive such data, as their employees are not subject to governmental disciplinary reprisals.

Several points merit emphasis. First the data without names but with street addresses are certainly not "anonymized." Second, no special effort is taken fully to anonymize the data with street addresses deleted. But third, both the census law and the Federal Constitution stipulate that no data of this type are to be used against any individuals. Everyone who comes into contact with census microdata--including university staff--has signed an employment agreement containing this general stipulation. As stated above, others who come into contact with data containing street addresses and/or names also sign a special confidentiality pledge. And fourth the census relationship with the population registers is an important loophole: information on the registers can legally be used for enforcement purposes.

History of the 1981, 1982, 1983 Census. The enabling legislation for the next census did not pass at first because of budgetary disagreements between the Bundestag and Bundesrat in 1980. However, preparation for the April 1981 census day proceeded at the national, state, and local levels. Forms were printed and procedures detailed, but the federal government and the states could not reach agreement on the payment the states would receive. Accordingly, the census was first tentatively scheduled for 1981, then delayed until spring 1982 and finally until spring 1983.

The original 1981 census budget totalled 500 million marks (\$200 million), but the Bundestag cut the amount to 371 million marks. To meet this budget, the Federal Statistical Office cut the housing questions to less than half the number on the 1981 form. Originally, the states had asked for 5 marks per person; after three census postponements, all parties agreed to a per-capita transfer of 2.5 marks. In the meantime, the 1979 draft of the Census Law was revised to reflect the reduced questionnaire and the new timeframe. In 1982, the law was passed unanimously by the Bundestag and approved by the Bundesrat.

During this fiscal haggling, the various statistical offices continued to plan the census. Although the Federal Data Protection Officer and one of the state officers objected to some data-sharing provisions of the law as early as 1979, very few persons expressed concern for data confidentiality or other abridgement of personal rights. Some of the Data Protection Officers didn't even come to planning meetings. And when the microdata from the November 1982 prelisting of housing unit owners were turned over to the communities for preparing census lists, no one apparently objected. In fact, as late as December 1982, staff of the statistical offices found it hard to interest federal agencies, politicians, and the press in the census at all.

It is interesting to note that several high officials of the Federal Statistical Office had been saying in writing for some years that government microdata were too widely accessible. Their argument rested not on confidentiality grounds, but on the potential for various agencies to publish conflicting results due to their

differing definitions of variables, their ignorance of the data's detailed characteristics, and their differing program and policy inclinations. These arguments seem to have made no headway against increasing demands of federal and state ministries and agencies and of the communities for more microdata.

The first inkling of trouble with the census on other than fiscal grounds occurred in the fall of 1982 in Berlin. At a large peace rally, the organizers distributed flyers advising that if the government will not tell the people where U.S. missiles will be based, then the people should not tell the government about themselves in the census. The Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden asked the Berlin Statistical Office to look into the matter, but neither office paid it much attention. In the next months, similar rallies in Hamburg, Frankfurt, and university towns included the same statement and flyers. The missiles, not the census, were the focus. Those in politics and the press who did comment on the anti-census statement were against it. Even leaders of the Green Party, which was to spearhead the anti-census movement only three months later, asserted publically that census data are needed for planning purposes.

In late January and early February of 1983 the census issue suddenly caught fire. The Green Party, formed some five years earlier as a grass-roots campaign for ecological preservation, used the census as a vehicle for attacking government agencies' increasing appetite for computer data files on individuals. The party charged that various agencies and levels of government planned to use census data to identify and expel illegal aliens, to identify and enlist illegal draft dodgers, to locate tax evaders, and to ferret out persons illegally benefitting from various government programs. Further, they charged that data access under the census law would facilitate identification of unmarried persons living in communes, persons now or ever living in institutions, persons of particular religions, and others. All such information would be very dangerous in the hands of a "post-democratic" government or, indeed, in the hands of current government ministries interested in more efficient operation of their programs.

Because the 1982 law had been written and passed by the Social Democratic-Free Democratic government now defending its record in the national elections, the Green Party used the law and the census as a platform for attack. The Social Democrats were forced to defend. The Christian Democrats, who were to win the election, largely sat this battle out. Shortly before the election, the German media actively joined the fray. Die Zeit, one of the world's respected international newspapers, was the first to suggest postponement of the census pending careful reexamination of the content and accessibility of the data. Der Spiegel and Der Stern also adopted this position. Among major print media, only the Frankfurter Allgemein and the tabloid newspapers supported the census to the end. Television and radio reports and commentary were also predominantly anti-census. There seems to have been a fairly clear split in the media according to political viewpoint, with the liberal outlets that favored the Social Democrats opposing the census, and the

conservative media that favored the Christian Democrats, supporting it.

Considering that not more than a dozen independent articles about the German census problems have appeared in the U.S. press, compared to heavy treatment of the roles of the U.S. missiles and German unemployment in the German election, I was amazed to find that the census had been, in fact, a major election issue. Several persons I interviewed guessed that a third of the pre-election press concerned the census.

Following the election on March 6, opposition spread and intensified. Pamphlets and fliers disseminated widely throughout the country. Some carried precise advice on how to avoid both the census and the fine: Don't open the door to the enumerator; say you mailed it back; write foolish answers. A book entitled Census 1983--containing one article by staff of the Federal Statistical Office among all the others questioning or denouncing the census--appeared widely in bookstores. Sales of Orwell's 1984 flourished. The Social Democratic Candidate for Chancellor who, as Minister of Interior in 1979 had actually written the census law, turned against part of it. Some other high officials and members of the Bundestag followed suit, some proclaiming publicly that they would not answer all census questions. And the Data Protection Officers of all the states wrote a document protesting data-sharing aspects of the Census law to the Constitutional Court.

The new government at first supported the census, but then wavered. Chancellor Kohl reminded the nation that the census law had been passed by both Houses of Parliament; however, the Cabinet might consider the issue again if the concerns of the population about possible misuse of census data could be substantiated.

Outside the federal government, the Minister-Presidents of several states also called for postponement of the census. And those of the state Data Protection Officers who had not already turned, did so now. Gunter Grass added his influential support to the boycott.

The opposition of these political and opinion leaders ran a spectrum from suggesting postponement so that the census could be explained adequately to people, to demanding cancellation accompanied by thorough narrowing of ministries' and agencies' access to data. Over most of this spectrum it became politically and socially acceptable--perhaps advisable--to announce one's own intention to boycott the census and so to advise others. Such widespread and open flouting of the law is unprecedented in post-war Germany.

By no means did the federal and state statistical offices and the Ministry of the Interior take all this lying down. When the Green Party members called for a census boycott in the first hours of the newly elected Bundestag, other members rose to document the widespread uses of census data. They and ministers of the new government discussed the inefficiencies and waste that result from using data updated from 13 years back (the 1970 census). They emphasized the need for good employment data for local areas. The Interior Minister and the Federal Data Protection Officer both gave their personal assurances that the law guarantees full data protection.

The Federal Statistical Office sought to

explain the Census Law and procedures to members of the press. This Office also mounted a publicity campaign of its own, which was planned to culminate in the final pre-census weeks in flyers, posters, interviews, and radio and television spots. Statistical Office spokespersons argued that some persons misuse knives but we still make and sell them. Cars kill, but we don't outlaw them. Likewise, census data might occasionally suffer misuse, but their great benefits outweigh these negative possibilities. Chancellor Kohl, himself, was scheduled to speak to the nation on April 21 in support of the census.

All this was swamped by the widening opposition, some of whose arguments were now turning more radical. The Greens argued back in the Bundestag that the government was not really so badly run, that no bad decision could be directly attributed to 13 year-old data. Die Zeit announced that census data are not really very useful anyway; some combination of data from the population registers and sample surveys would be very adequate. Hence, if the census procedures and access are dangerous and if the data have little value, the case seems clear.

By early April, prominent trade unions who heretofore supported the census for the employment data it would provide, turned against it. Scattered groups of recruited census workers announced their misgivings or refusals. And a respected survey organization confirmed the extent of the protest: 52 percent of the polled West Germans distrusted the uses of census data, and 25 percent said they would not participate.

By now more than 1000 suits against the census had come before the Constitutional Court. The Court elected to consider two, and on April 14 ruled in their favor, directing that the census be postponed until autumn when the Court would consider arguments in detail and rule on the constitutionality of the Census Law. The Court decided 8 to 0 on a stay concerning the data access provisions of the 1982 law and 5 to 3 on a postponement of the total census until the constitutionality of the law has been tested.

Although the opposition sprang at the end from many sources, the issues that united it are simple to state: confidentiality of census data and possibilities of misuse against individuals. During the census process itself, people feared that local workers, including police and tax workers in a few places, would see the completed forms. Then through its duplication onto local population registers, part of the information would henceforth be available to many agencies that might use it for punitive action, for example to identify draft dodgers. Firms and persons also may have access to the register. Finally, the data, including addresses, would flow to all manner of ministries, agencies, offices, and research institutes, which might misuse them for punitive purposes.

No such actions based on census data have ever been publicly identified. In the uproar, much of the population apparently didn't realize this. Many others did realize it but thought there was insufficient protection from misuse. Arguments about the efficiencies of government data sharing were not only ineffective, they were turned against the census. As a prominent example, Die Zeit editorialized that the government doesn't

care about citizens' right of privacy, being willing to sacrifice it to achieve the efficiencies of automation and interagency cooperation: "Citizens must go to war against the bureaucrats and stop the government's urge to know it all."

Critics built their cases time and again by constructing scenarios of possible data misuse: 'This question combined with this and that one will identify persons who do a certain activity. Now merge those three with this ministry's administrative files, and the following abuses can occur.' Administrative actions based on census data must not only be illegal, many said; they must be impossible.

Who was to blame for this mess? I am in no position to decide, but here are some German opinions on both sides: The members of the Bundestag for not scrutinizing the law in 1979 and 1982; the Data Protection Officers for failing early to catch the obvious possibilities for data misuse; the press for playing fast and loose with the facts; the politicians for knuckling under to election year pressures; the newly elected Chancellor for failing to speak up forcefully for the census; the statistical offices for failing to mount an effective campaign. As always in such cases, there is no dearth of possibly guilty parties.

The Court Decision and the Future. On April 20 the Constitutional Court requested the federal government, the state governments, the Federal Statistical Office and the 11 Data Protection Officers to answer 14 questions on which the Court would base its autumn hearings. Much of the questions' content concerned the exact purposes of the census data; four of the questions inquired about the need at all for a census of the whole population.

On December 15, the German Constitutional Court issued its ruling on the census. The decision can be summarized as follows:

- ° At present, a census is necessary for governmental planning and decisionmaking. However, any future census legislation must consider the most recent developments in statistical methodology to determine if a census can be replaced by alternative methods.
- ° The content of the form is OK, and legislators need not specify the purposes of each question.
- ° Census data may not be linked or matched with information on the population registers.
- ° Individual records, even without names, cannot be given to federal and state ministries for analysis purposes in connection with their administrative duties, or to local communities.

So the government is permitted to plan a census, but distribution and uses of the data will be narrowed.

Following testimony and debate, the Parliament passed Census enabling legislation on April 17, 1985. This legislation does limit the distribution and uses of the data as stipulated by the High Court, and it also affirms the necessity of a census. There remains the question of timing, with argument for 1986 or 1988 falling substantially along political party lines. The

opposition party is arguing for the later year. Parliamentary decision is expected in the summer.

This recent turmoil affected some current surveys of the statistical offices. Most important, the Federal Ministry of Interior decided in mid-May, 1983, to cancel the one percent microcensus of the population which had been conducted annually since 1957 and was scheduled for the following week. This questionnaire had more detail than the census on income and other personal matters, but the data would not have been combined with population register information or released to other government agencies in micro-form. Response to the microcensus is legally obligatory and response rates in previous years had been in the 97-98 percent range. Little press opposition to the microcensus had emerged but the government cancelled it nevertheless.

The statistical offices did proceed in the summer of 1983 with the biennial EEC-sanctioned labor-force survey. Respondent resistance was not a particular problem, but technical problems in the processes of interviewing and form return may have created biases in these data. The consumption and income survey, which is voluntary, was also conducted that summer. Some respondents refused to cooperate for reasons related to the protest, and some others asked that their forms be returned. Still, overall nonresponse rates were in the normal range. Some staff of the federal and state statistical offices think that this survey's voluntary nature made it less objectionable.

Beyond Germany. The census protest phenomenon is beyond Germany, in countries with very different characteristics and circumstances. Before the 1971 British census, some dissidents threatened to obtain completed census forms and publicize them. The Statistical Office increased security, including more guards with dogs, and nothing happened. Officials took greater precautions in 1981, again without trouble.

The Swiss had considerable difficulties in 1981. Several groups objected strongly to particular census questions. The day before the census, professionally-made posters appeared throughout the country announcing that the census had been cancelled and that people should destroy the forms. The statistical office apparently required months actually to complete the enumeration.

The Dutch have the most extreme situation so far. Public worries about potential misuses of census data and skepticism about the data's value caused nonresponse rates to jump up in the 1971 census. The Central Bureau of Statistics worked hard the next decade to counteract these feelings, but to no avail. The two census pretests in 1979 and 1980 registered nonresponse rates of around fifty percent in the major cities. Faced with a census of limited accuracy, the Bureau decided not to conduct the 1981 census. It has still not been held. Most knowledgeable observers doubt that it will be, although there are indications that the lack of small area statistical data from administrative records is beginning to be felt. It is of tangential interests that the United Nations and some

other funders are planning to reduce their financial support of 1990 censuses in less developed countries. Their rationale is not that the data are either dangerous or unnecessary, but that the countries should now be financing their own censuses.

Concluding Points.

- Germans' concerns about census data changed from a systematic watch by 11 appointed officials looking for actual data abuses, to an unfocused fear by half the population afraid of conceivable data abuses. Much of the public and press and many politicians turned from disinterest to protest in only 6 to 8 weeks.
- The Bundestag passed the census enabling legislation unanimously in 1982. Before and after, the German Federal Statistical Office conducted numerous external reviews of substance, statistics, and procedures in developing the census. Having expressed few reservations earlier did not stop people from protesting later.
- The Federal Statistical Office's inability even to interest the politicians and press in the census as late as December 1982 offered no signal of coming trouble.
- The complete historical absence of government abuses of census data since World War II did not stop the public fears. The illegality of using census data against persons did not stop the protest. Many people wanted not only illegality, but impossibility.
- Dissidents and much of the public came to view government efficiencies in collecting and using data as bad, not good.
- As the protest heated, responsible newspapers and magazines argued that census data are not only dangerous; they are not very useful anyway.
- When the heat was on, political support for statistical activities was noticeably lacking.
- Though important contributors, the peculiarities of German history and census-taking procedures cannot, in my opinion, account for the extent and force of the protest. Other census protests have occurred recently in Switzerland and The Netherlands. These respondent difficulties, so to speak, are a completely new phenomenon in Europe.
- The Court, in approving this census, served notice that the Federal Statistical Office is to investigate substitutes for censuses, and that a census will be more difficult to justify the next time.
- Public opposition would probably prevent merging of administrative lists to take the place of a German census.
- Ultimately the citizenry, not the Court or the Parliament, will decide if the census takes place. Following the Court approval and the Census enabling legislation, the Statistical Offices now face the task of building citizen cooperation. It is not a foregone conclusion that they can do this.

Footnotes

1/ In some circumstances complete agreement is not required. For example, each state has the option of adding questions to the census for its area. In 1983 only two states added questions, both concerning housing.

2/ However, the state of Bavaria announced a bounty for discovery of persons not on the registers, with double bounty for foreigners.

3/ I think this has been interpreted quite liberally in many municipalities.

FLOW OF CENSUS MICRODATA
As Proposed by 1982 Census Law

