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A large number of experiments have been reported in recent years that show the sensitivity of survey responses to question form, wording, and context.¹ Such findings are bound to disturb social scientists who rely on the survey method for substantive results, as well as inviting renewed criticism from those more skeptical of survey data (Cicourel, 1982). It is natural in such a situation to search for a general theory, or at least general guidelines, that will separate fact from artifact, and this desire is encouraged by attempts in more factual areas to assess "total survey error" (Anderson et al., 1979).

The present paper challenges such orientations in several respects, at least with regard to surveys of attitudes, beliefs, or values. First, we show that for one important type of context effect the attempt to separate fact from artifact is misleading. This is not because of inadequacies in the survey method, but because human responses differ meaningfully as a function of previous responses and the survey method copies life in displaying such variation systematically. Second, the theory to be presented includes an important normative specification and therefore does not allow for a universal psychological, statistical, or mechanical explanation for response effects. Thus the theory is social psychological in the full meaning of that term. Third, the theory is middle-range and inherently self-limiting: it covers well a number of results not previously collected or clearly conceptualized; yet at the same time it implies that other theories, different though perhaps not completely dissimilar, will be needed for other types of response effects. Above all, the theory emphasizes the use of the survey method as a means to understanding the complexity of human responses in ongoing interaction, rather than as a simple device for reporting preexisting mental states.

The Norm of Even-Handedness

The theory can be stated initially in the form of a generalization: Context effects will occur whenever two questions deal with differently evaluated competing parties that can be viewed in terms of the norm of even-handedness. This norm provides that if an advantage (or disadvantage) is given to one party in a dispute, it should be given to the other as well. Thus the norm becomes operative in those situations where a respondent might tend to favor one of the two parties, but where the norm when evoked requires more even-handed treatment. Life is full of such occasions, whether at the level of distributing rewards to children in a family or at the level of international disputes over boundary rights. In all such cases the claim of even-handed treatment counterbalances the tendency to favor a single party on the grounds of self-interest or preference.²

In questionnaires the norm of even-handedness becomes important because its salience can be enhanced by question order. If a question

stands alone (or comes first, which is equivalent for our purposes) and is worded so as to focus on the rights of only one of the parties to a dispute, then personal preference (for or against that party) may be expressed. But if the same question follows another that deals with the opposite party to a dispute, then the norm will tend to be evoked and thus modify responses, creating a context effect. Since the norm has implications in the direction of equalizing both advantages and disadvantages, a context effect should occur regardless of which question comes first; i.e., the effect should tend to be symmetrical. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the effect resides in the nature of the norm of even-handedness and therefore cannot be avoided by omitting one of the questions, since omission itself constitutes a kind of context.³

Evidence

We have located four distinct experiments involving different applications of the norm of even-handedness and each produces a meaningful context effect. Three of the experiments have been previously published in widely scattered places and will be summarized briefly. The fourth is reported here for the first time. Results from all four experiments are summarized in Table 1.⁴ A fifth new experiment is reported at a later point.

(See Table 1)

1. Friend or Foe. The earliest instance of a context effect attributable to the norm of even-handedness was reported by Rugg and Cantril (1944) for a split-ballot experiment carried out just before World War II. One question to a national sample asked whether American citizens should be allowed to join the British or French armies; the other question asked about joining the German army. When each question appeared first in sequence, it is evident from Table 1 that many more respondents approved of the Allied (49%) than of the German connection (23%). The context effect manifested itself in both directions; when the German question came second, approval to it went up 11 percentage points (relative to the level obtained when it came first); when the Allies question came second, approval to it went down 6 percentage points. The gap in approval levels between joining Allied and German armies was $49\% - 23\% = 26\%$ when each question was in the 1st position, but decreased to $43\% - 34\% = 9\%$ when each was in 2nd position.⁵ The relation of response to question order was apparently significant for each question.⁶

2. Strikes or Lockouts. Link (1946) carried out an experiment in which one question asked about the rights of workers to strike and another question asked about the rights of businessmen to lock out workers. The questions were ordered oppositely for each half of a national sample. There was more support for strikes than for lockouts, but the difference was greater ($66\% - 47\% = 19\%$) when each question was in the

1st position than when each was in the 2nd position (61%-52% = 9%). Support for strikes dropped after the lockout question had been asked first; support for lockouts rose after the strike question had been asked first. Each response by order relation is reported to be significant.

3. Americans or Russians. Hyman and Sheatsley (1950) asked one question about whether American reporters should be allowed to report freely from the Soviet Union, and another question about whether "Communist reporters" should be allowed to report freely from the United States. Not surprisingly there was much more support for the former than the latter view. When each question was in the 1st position, the difference was 90%-36% = 54%, whereas in 2nd position the difference actually reversed (66%-73% = -7%). The experiment was replicated in 1980 by Schuman and Presser (1981) with similar results, but with some additional findings that will be noted below.

4. Corporations or Labor Unions. This experiment was carried out by the Gallup Poll in 1947, but has apparently not been previously published.⁷ It fits nicely under the even-handedness norm, for complementary actions by two competing organizations are evaluated. As shown by the comparison of marginals in Table 1, more respondents agreed that unions should be allowed to make political contributions than agreed with a similar action by corporations. But context reversed the first position difference of 23%-13% = 10% to a second position difference of 16%-24% = -8%.

For this experiment, as for the others discussed earlier, we have drawn our interpretation of the context effect from shifts in marginals from one question order to another. This inference can be further tested by observing whether the shifts occur within the predicted cells when items are cross-tabulated for each form. Table 2 provides such confirmation for the Corporations and Unions experiment, since most of the marginal shifts can be traced to movements between consistent "yes" and consistent "no" cells. Thus, the rise in support for corporations when the question comes after the union question is due largely to a drop for that form in the proportion in the No-No cell and a rise in the proportion Yes-Yes.⁸ (Cross-tabulations of the reporter items show the same patterns; for the other two experiments already discussed, only marginal results are available.)

(See Table 2)

Viewing the Four Context Effects Systematically

The results from the above four experiments seem to us to provide strong evidence that the norm of even-handedness operates forcefully over a wide range of issues asked about in attitude surveys. In each case we can regard responses to a question located in 1st position as representing attitudes in the classic sense of positive or negative affect toward an object (Thurstone, 1931). When the same questions appear 2nd, a number of responses shift and reflect adherence to the norm (of even-handedness). Thus the context effect moves people from personal attitude to public norm, no doubt because it points up the relevance of the norm of even-

handedness to the response. We do not claim of course that no responses in the 1st position are influenced by the even-handedness norm, nor that no responses in the 2nd position involve simply the attitude object, but only that context makes the norm more explicit and thereby changes the balance in the two positions. Nor do we claim that what we call attitude responses are without normative influence (e.g., a norm in America to appear anti-Communist), but it does seem likely that these object-oriented responses represent something closer to a simple pro/con attitudinal level than do the answers given once the even-handedness norm is stressed. The latter answers resemble much more the moves of diplomats who must develop their positions in negotiation with their opposites and are therefore constantly being reminded of the norm of even-handedness.

Review of Table 1 suggests several other considerations about this type of context effect. First, the difference between responses to a pair of questions is always reduced when one item follows the other over what it would have been if each item had appeared first in a separate survey. For example, responses to the questions about joining the Allied and the German armies differ by 26% when each is in 1st position, but the difference is reduced to 15% when the German question comes second and to 20% when the Allied question comes second. This is of course simply another way of viewing the effects of the norm of even-handedness, but it shows more clearly what happens to a realistic sequence of such items. Second, these within-form differences due to context can be averaged and compared to the differences for 1st positions. When both are listed by size, the rank order association is perfect:

	1st Positions	Average difference after reduction due to context
Americans and Russians	54	23.5
Friends and Foes	26	17.5
Strikes and Lockouts	19	14
Corporations and Unions	10	1

Thus the greater the initial difference between the questions, the larger the average difference that remains after context has operated on responses to the second question. It seems possible that the reduction from the first position difference between questions is some roughly constant proportion of the original difference.

Finally, in each experiment it is interesting to compare the size of the effect due to context for each item. For example, responses to the Allies question shift 6% from its 1st to its 2nd position location, and responses to the German question shift 11% between 1st and 2nd positions. In three of the four cases the action that is least popular, as indicated by 1st position marginals, shows the greatest shift, with the fourth case producing a tie. With such a small sample of items, any generalization is quite speculative, but this one appears worth checking in later experiments. If the generalization is valid, it implies that the context

effect is not perfectly symmetrical, but tends to operate more strongly in one direction than in another.

A Useful Negative Result

A sharper conceptualization of the even-handedness norm can be gained by comparing the four context effects discussed above with the absence of a context effect in what might at first seem a similar experiment reported by Schuman and Presser (1981). The latter presented an item asking whether lawyers were interested in the public good or simply in making money, and an exactly parallel item about doctors. As the authors expected, lawyers were more frequently characterized as mercenary than were doctors (72% of respondents on the lawyer question, as against 50% on the doctor question). But contrary to prediction, these results were not significantly affected by the order of the questions. Thus it was not the case that respondents brought their views of doctors and lawyers closer together because of context, for example, saying that doctors were mercenary because they had previously said that lawyers were mercenary.

Reflection on this negative finding suggests that more than a vague principle of consistency is required before context will have its effect. The four positive effects all involve the issues of rights to act by parties in competition with each other. The issue in each case reads: if A is allowed to do X_1 , should not B also be allowed to do X_2 ? For example:

If some Americans are allowed to join one army, shouldn't other Americans be allowed to join an opposing army?

If workers are allowed to withhold their work to win their way, shouldn't businessmen be allowed to deny work to win their way?

Etc.

A kind of reciprocity is involved in each of these instances, although we do not use that term because the respondent is not necessarily a party to the competition. The doctor-lawyer experiment, on the other hand, neither treats the two parties (doctors, lawyers) as in direct competition, nor asks whether they should be allowed to act in the same or parallel ways. Instead, it simply characterizes the two occupants along similar lines. Apparently, a competitive relation between the parties and a judgment of possible actions by them are necessary for the norm to be brought into play, although, it is possible that only one of these elements is essential.

A Further Test of the Even-Handedness Theory

Our interpretations thus far have all been inductive, an attempt to generalize from the positive and negative results of past context experiments. To the degree that the attempt has been successful, we should be in a position to construct further experiments that operationalize the theory with different issues but produce the same type of context effect. We attempted to do this by constructing two questions about the erection of national trade barriers, using Japan and the United States as the two competing parties. The issues in this case are not only important, but also unlike any that appear in past experiments.

We developed the following two questions and included them as a split-ballot question order experiment in a February, 1982, telephone survey of a national cross-section of Americans:

Do you think that the American government should be allowed to set limits on how much Japanese industry can sell in the United States?

1. Yes, should be allowed
2. No, should not be allowed

Do you think that the Japanese government should be allowed to set limits on how much American industry can sell in Japan?

1. Yes, should be allowed
2. No, should not be allowed

Our hypotheses were:

1. When each question is in 1st position, more respondents will favor trade restrictions by the United States than by Japan.

2. When the question about trade restrictions by the United States appears 1st, agreement to trade restrictions by Japan will rise.

3. When the question about trade restrictions by Japan appears 1st, agreement to trade restrictions by the U. S. will decline.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 assume context effects in both directions, i.e., contextual symmetry. But based on past results a fourth hypothesis is possible:

4. Trade restrictions by Japan, being less favored than U. S. trade restrictions, should show the greater change due to context.

(See Table 3)

Results from the new experiment are presented in Table 3. As expected, when comparison is made between each question in 1st position, more Americans support U. S. trade restrictions (76%) than support Japanese trade restrictions (48%) ($X_1^2 = 28.82, p < .001$). Thus self-interest prevails when the norm of even-handedness is not made explicit. It is notable, however, that nearly half the sample supported trade restrictions by Japan even when that question came first, a somewhat puzzling disavowal of self-interest that we return to below.

In accord with our second hypothesis, there is a large and significant context effect on the Japan item when it appears 2nd, raising the percentage supporting trade barriers by Japan from 48% to 70%, very close to the level of support initially given to the preceding U. S. item (76%). There is also a decline in support for U. S. trade restrictions when this item appears in 2nd position, but contrary to hypothesis 3 the effect is small and does not approach significance. We suspect that the effect is real, but for this size sample it cannot be distinguished from sampling error. Finally, the fourth hypothesis is supported, in that the effect is larger on the item dealing with the less popular action.

In sum, this new experiment seems to have created context effects along the lines expected, but the asymmetry is much greater than in previous experiments, and forces us to modify or at least temper our assumption that the norm of even-handedness always has implications in both directions. Evidently, the norm can be powerful in one direction, but produce little or no effect

in the opposite direction. Why the asymmetry occurs for these questions on trade restrictions, but not for questions having to do with, say, joining Allied or German armies is unclear. One possible explanation is that the economic problems arising out of Japanese-U. S. trade relations are perceived by Americans almost entirely in terms of competition for the U. S. market, not competition for the Japanese market, and in this connection Japan is seen as having such a strong trade advantage that righting the balance precludes reducing U. S. trade restrictions. Respondents may be less concerned about what Japan does in the way of trade restrictions, hence more willing to shift their response on this question, but so exercised about "unfair" Japanese exports to the United States that they are unwilling to oppose U. S. restrictions even when they are not reciprocal.

We noted earlier that nearly half the sample favored allowing Japan to set trade barriers when that question came first. Narrow self-interest can hardly explain this finding. A plausible interpretation is that some respondents answer in terms of even-handedness even when the norm is not made explicit. In a separate small national survey of 41 respondents in March, we asked only the question about Japanese barriers, then for those who said yes, we followed with an open "why" question ("Could you tell me why you feel that way?")¹⁰ Of the 24 respondents who said yes, nearly three-quarters (17) gave a reason involving reciprocity or even-handedness; that is, they answered that the U. S. had or would set such restrictions. For example, one person said: "We set limits, so they should be allowed to set limits...it's only fair." Thus for some respondents the norm of even-handedness enters implicitly when a question to which it is relevant is asked, while for others the norm operates only when context makes it salient. It would obviously be useful to distinguish these two types of respondents more generally.

Individual Susceptibility to the Contextual Norm

There are indications, as we have just seen, that some respondents are influenced by the norm of even-handedness even when an item comes first in a sequence, whereas others are affected only when context makes the norm salient. A plausible hypothesis is that this difference is tied to cognitive sophistication, which in turn can be measured to some degree by education. More informed and sophisticated respondents may carry with them a better sense of the relevance of the even-handedness norm, whereas those less informed and sophisticated may recognize the norm only when its pertinence is pointed up by context. Table 4 presents results by education for both the trade restrictions experiment and the union/corporation political contributions experiment.

(See Table 4)

The trade restriction results appear to support the hypothesis just stated. Among high educated respondents there is little effect of context, but low educated respondents show a large effect, even on the U. S. item which revealed only a non-significant trend for the sample as a whole. Both of the interactions with

education are significant. Basically similar interactions are reported by Schuman and Presser (1982: p. 31) for replications in 1980 of the original Hyman and Sheatsley (1950) reporter experiments.

However, the experiment on political contributions by corporations and unions in the bottom panel of Table 4 shows no sign whatever of such an interaction with education. The context occurs at all educational levels, and in fact is weakest among the least educated. This raises serious questions about a general interpretation based on cognitive limitations of less educated respondents, for if this is the generic reason for context effects due to the norm of even-handedness, then it is difficult to see why there should be any exceptions at all to its applicability.

A somewhat different interpretation is possible for the contradictory findings in Table 4. The interaction in the top panel can be traced to the disproportionate expression of national self-interest in answers by the least educated: their nearly unanimous support for U. S. restrictions and almost equally unanimous opposition to Japanese restrictions when each of these items comes first. Thus the least educated are more likely to have gone out on a nationalistic limb in their 1st position answers and are therefore most vulnerable to the force of the norm once it is evoked by context. In the case of the political contributions items, however, there is no initial difference in responses by education, and hence no reason for a differential shift by education once context is brought into play.

The distinction between the cognitive and the nationalistic interpretations is subtle but important. One relies on assumptions about general psychological processes and their distribution according to education. The other focuses on the substantive content of attitudes and the way this varies by education. We do not believe it possible at this point to decide unequivocally between the two interpretations, nor indeed to be sure that other explanatory factors are not operating. Having seen that results from a single experiment can be misleading if generalized too far, it is necessary for there to be a wider range of experimentation on even-handedness before attempting to draw firm conclusions about all the processes involved.¹¹

Another important problem is whether the context effect of the norm is to tap a strictly internal and previously unrecognized value, or simply to make respondents aware of a possible inconsistency in the eyes of the interviewer. These two interpretations are not more easily separated here than they are in discussions of normative influence more generally (cf. Wrong, 1961).

Conclusions

Our results lead to several conclusions important to the use of surveys in the study of social and political issues. First, it is possible to generalize about one class of context effects and, we believe, predict their occurrence with a fair degree of success. We cannot predict their exact size, nor the degree of symmetry in the effect, but cumulation of results may move us in these directions.

Second, in this case the effect is not due to an "artifact" in any simple sense, but rather to the fact that human behavior (including the behavior known as answering a question) can be more or less influenced by a given norm depending upon the exact situation. For example, many people eat more politely when in a restaurant with others than when eating at home alone; both behaviors are real and it is only from a particular theoretical perspective that we would call one behavior more artifactual than the other. The activation of the norm of even-handedness in the course of an interview is not fundamentally different from its activation in other areas of life, as by having it explicitly mentioned by one of the parties to a dispute or by a mediator to the dispute.

Third, the class of effects due to the even-handedness norm seems to lie midway between the hope that a single theory of response effect can be developed and the despair that only a mass of disparate effects can be accumulated. Although the results summarized here certainly point to some generality in conclusions, it is a generality based on the content of a specific social norm, not on a wholly general psychological process. To be sure, a broad need or motive to be consistent seems to be involved, but the consistency motive takes on contextual meaning and force only when it is normatively shaped. Once this is recognized, it becomes clearer why some forms of inconsistency motivate context effects and some do not.

Footnotes

¹Schuman and Presser (1981) include a review of the past literature on question effects, as well as a number of new experiments of their own.

²When only the parties to a dispute are affected by the norm, it becomes the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). "Even-handedness" implies a third more neutral party, and we prefer that term because in the experiments to be reported, respondents are treated as third parties. From another perspective, however, it would have been legitimate to entitle this paper "The Norm of Reciprocity in Surveys as in Life."

³The even-handedness norm assumes a still larger overarching normative framework within which both parties are located socially, so that anything does not go. Where there is a complete normative breakdown, as in war-time, the norm of even-handedness may be abandoned: one would not expect the norm to operate to make one believe that the enemy should be allowed to bomb our cities because we have bombed the enemy's cities, though there may be some pale and reluctant reflection of this sentiment. This basic assumption of a larger normative framework is similar to that enunciated by Durkheim (1893) about contractual obligations.

⁴It is interesting to note that the four experiments in Table 1 were all carried out within a five-year period nearly four decades ago, yet no larger generalization was ever developed because the results were never brought together. One experiment was not published at all, a second only alluded to in published form, and a third was located in an out-of-the-way journal.

Fourth, there is no compelling reason to believe that other context effects reported in the literature (e.g., Kalton et al., 1978) are connected in any direct way to the norm of even-handedness. In other words, the sources of context effects--and of response effects more generally--are quite likely multiple, not unitary, and we may well require a set of theories, not a single grand theory. Furthermore, some response effects may well be artifactual in a simple sense, as seems likely the case with primacy effects when respondents are asked to make choices from long lists (Becker, 1954). Yet despite this variety there is no reason to lose heart provided that we can move toward meaningful generalizations of the type illustrated by the norm of even-handedness. It is possible that these in turn can eventually be integrated or at least linked in a more comprehensive way, but we had best start with more modest middle-range generalizations if we hope to take concrete steps forward.

Finally, it was simple experiments on the way survey questions are asked that pointed out the coercive force of the norm of even-handedness, and this suggests the value of further systematic attempts to generalize from such experiments. They become not only a means of discovering potential response effects in surveys, but of studying the forces that shape responses in ordinary social interactions as well. It is our feeling that the two goals are often essentially the same.

Only the Rugg and Cantril experiment received more than passing attention, but the authors offered no interpretation of the results and in isolation its larger implications went unrecognized

⁵It should be noted that comparisons between item differences in 2nd position are artificial in the sense that outside of experiments such as these, one would ordinarily not have both items in 2nd position. But the comparison brings out the degree of change such a rotation can create.

⁶Rugg and Cantril (1944) do not provide significance levels or N's in this case, but both their usual practice in reporting conclusions and their typically large N's suggest that at least one and probably both of these relationships are significant. The percentages reported here omit don't know responses; their inclusion does not change the picture.

⁷Data were obtained from the Roper Center.

⁸There is virtually no change between the top right cells, but there is a noticeable variation between the bottom left cells, which reflects some asymmetry in the context effect. That is, the union item is somewhat less affected by context than is the corporation item. This seemingly minor deviation from our initial hypothesis that a context effect due to even-handedness will be symmetrical foreshadows a much clearer asymmetry to be discussed below.

⁹Interviews were carried out by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. Random digit dial procedures were used to select

households and one adult over 18 was chosen randomly within each households. The response rate was 76.9%; 419 interviews were obtained. The experiment discussed here appeared about a third of the way through the survey; no previous items dealt with international trade.

¹⁰The small size is due to our use of a preliminary cross-section sample drawn for other purposes in planning a larger RDD sample.

¹¹Analysis by education of the other two experiments in Table 1 is not possible, since the original data are not available.

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Table 1
Percent Yes in Four Independent Context Effects

	<u>Position</u>		<u>Difference</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	
1. <u>Friend or Foe</u> (Rugg and Cantril, 1944) ^a			
Should the United States permit its citizens to join the French and British armies?	49%	43%	- 6%
Should the United States permit its citizens to join the German army?	23%	34%	+11%
2. <u>Strikes or Lockouts</u> (Link, 1946) ^b			
Do you believe that workers and unions have the right to strike when wages and working conditions don't suit them?	66%	61%	- 5%
	(2500)	(2500)	
Do you believe that businessmen have a right to shut down their factories and stores when labor conditions and profits don't suit them?	47%	52%	+ 5%
	(2500)	(2500)	
3. <u>Americans or Russians</u> (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1950)			
Do you think a Communist country like Russia should let American newspaper reporters come in and send back to America the news as they see it?	90%	66%	-24%
	(635)	(567)	
Do you think the United States should let Communist newspaper reporters from other countries come in here and send back to their papers the news as they see it?	36%	73%	+37%
	(581)	(635)	
4. <u>Corporations or Labor Unions</u> (Gallup, 1947)			
Do you think labor unions should be permitted to spend labor funds (money) to help elect or defeat candidates for political offices?	23%	16%	- 7%
	(1376)	(1313)	
Do you think business corporations should be permitted to spend corporations funds (money) to help elect or defeat candidates for political offices?	14%	24%	+10%
	(1320)	(1362)	

^aN's on which percentages are based were not reported.

^bN's on which percentages are based are approximations, based on a reported total N of 5000.

Table 2
Even-Handedness in Corporation and Union Political Contributions^a

ORDER: A. <u>Corporations/Unions</u>				B. <u>Unions/Corporations</u>				
	<u>Corporations</u>				<u>Corporations</u>			
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>			<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>		
<u>Unions</u>	<u>Yes</u>	10.9%		5.4	16.3%	<u>Yes</u>		18.1%
	<u>No</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>81.3</u>	<u>83.7</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>71.3</u>	<u>76.8</u>
		13.3%	86.7%	100		23.6%	76.4%	100
				(1298)				(1336)
		Corporations: Response x Position $X_{12}^2 = 47.05, p < .001$				Unions: Response x Position $X_{12}^2 = 17.62, p < .001$		

^aSee Table 1 for item wording.

Table 3

Even-Handedness in U. S. and Japanese Trade Restrictions

		ORDER: A. <u>United States/Japan</u>			B. <u>Japan/United States</u>		
		<u>United States</u>			<u>United States</u>		
		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
<u>Japan</u>	<u>Yes</u>	69.2%	1.0	70.2%			
	<u>No</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>29.8</u>			
		75.9%	24.1	100			
				(195)			(186)

U. S. Restrictions: Response x Position $X_{12}^2 = 1.19$
 Japanese Restrictions: Response x Position $X_1^2 = 19.98$

Table 4

Percentage Saying Yes by Education and Context in Two Experiments*

A. Trade Restrictions

	<u>Education</u>		
	<u>0-11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13+</u>
<u>Trade Restrictions by Japan</u>			
Order: Limits by Japan 1st	38.7% (31)	44.8% (69)	55.8% (86)
Order: Limits by Japan 2nd	86.2% (29)	66.7% (69)	67.0% (100)
Odds ratio:	.10	.41	.62
	Response x order x education: linear $X^2 = 6.38$, df = 1, $p < .01$		

Trade Restrictions by U. S.

Order: Limits by U. S. 1st	96.7% (30)	75.4% (69)	68.3% (101)
Order: Limits by U. S. 2nd	66.7% (33)	73.9% (69)	70.1% (87)
Odds ratio:	.07	.93	1.09
	Response x order x education: linear $X^2 = 5.98$, df = 1, $p < .02$.		

B. Political Contributions

	<u>Education</u>		
	<u>0-11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13+</u>
<u>Contributions by Corporations</u>			
Order: Corporations 1st	13.0% (655)	11.9% (310)	16.7% (312)
Order: Corporations 2nd	22.8% (661)	23.5% (362)	27.1% (295)
Odds ratio	.50	.44	.54
	Response x order x education: linear $X^2 = 0.68$, df = 1, n.s.		

Contributions by Unions

Order: Unions 1st	21.2% (671)	23.4% (367)	26.9% (294)
Order: Unions 2nd	17.4% (648)	12.2% (311)	18.6% (312)
Odds ratio:	.79	.45	.62
	Response x order x education: linear $X^2 = 0.96$, df = 1, n.s.		

*Linear X^2 refers to the squared standardized values of the effect parameter (lambda) for the linear component of the three variable interactions involving education, response, and question order ("Standardized" refers to the division of the lambda values by their standard errors.) The linear X^2 's are based on the assumption of equal spacing of levels of the education variable, as explained in Goodman (1971).